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Logic and the Nature o/God, by Stephen T. Davis. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Co., 1983. 171 pp. $9.95. 
Reviewed by EDWARD WIERENGA, University of Rochester. 
This book is a closely-reasoned essay from the perspective of a Christian who 
takes the Bible "to be an authoritative record of God's acts of self-disclosure at 
various points in human history" (p. 2). The announced aim of the book "is to 
produce a concept of God that is or at least ought to be satisfying to Christians," 
according to whom "the term 'God' has meant.. .an omnipotent, loving spirit 
who created the world and who works for the salvation of human beings" (p. 
1). This might lead one to expect a discussion of divine love, creation, and 
salvation, but in fact the main focus is on the divine attributes and related topics 
typically treated by philosophers. Thus, there are chapters on eternality, omnis-
cience, immutability, foreknowledge, omnipotence, benevolence, and the 
problem of evil. There are, in addition, a pair of chapters on the doctrines of 
the Incarnation and the Trinity. Throughout Davis aims for clarity and rigor, 
and though, as he acknowledges, he depends heavily on the work of others, 
Davis considers a variety of important issues in the philosophy of religion, 
surveys some of the most important recent discussion of these issues, and fre-
quently adds insights of his own. In what follows, I shall offer some specific 
criticisms ofthe book and, in the process, reveal something of its scope and nature. 
In the first chapter, which is on God and time, Davis argues that if God is 
not in time he cannot create and he cannot be "personal, caring, and involved" 
in history (p. 14), and he claims that the opposing view that God is timeless is 
"probably incoherent" (p. 11). Davis then considers the recent formulation of 
divine timelessness by Stump and Kretzmann. 'One of Davis' objections is that 
a timeless being as described by Stump and Kretzmann cannot be a cause, since 
"causes must be prior to their effects." This principle, however, holds at most 
for event causation; it does not seem relevant to agent causation. So if it is God 
(and not God's action) that causes a particular effect, there seems to be no reason 
to insist on a temporal relation between God and the effect. 
The next chapter, "Omniscience," is primarily about God and time, as well. 
Davis argues that there are propositions whose truth value changes over time 
and that, since God knows them while they are true but not while they are false, 
there is a respect in which God changes. Davis gives as an example of such a 
proposition the proposition expressed by 
(1) Ronald Reagan is now president 
written on 16 June, 1982. Davis notes that some philosophers might claim that 
(1) on 16 June, 1982 expressed the same proposition as 
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(2) Ronald Reagan is president on 16 June, 1982, 
which does not vary in truth value. Davis' argument against this suggestion 
depends on the assumption that (1) always expresses the same proposition and 
that it is one that varies in truth value over time. Given this assumption Davis' 
conclusion follows: God knows propositions at some times that he does not know 
at other times. But another possibility is that sentences such as (1) express 
different eternal propositions at different times, and on this alternative Davis' 
conclusion does not follow. Davis provides no argument against this alternative, 
however, and several subsequent arguments (pp. 31,32, and 37) depend on the 
same unsupported assumption. 
Chapter 4 addresses the alleged incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and 
human free action. Recent discussions of this topic have concentrated on pointing 
out the flaws in arguments designed to establish that 
(3) God is omniscient 
and 
(4) Human beings are free 
are inconsistent, and this Davis does, too. Indeed his rejoinder to Pike's latest 
piece2 is deft and convincing. But Davis claims to do something more: his 
"aim .. .is to show that [(3)] and [(4)] are consistent" (p. 53). Davis says that 
"[o]ne way of showing that [(3)] and [(4)] are consistent is to find some third 
proposition ... which is consistent with [(3)] and which together with [(3)] entails 
[(4)]" (p. 53).3 Davis' candidate for the requisite third proposition is 
(5) What God knew yesterday is contingent upon what I will freely 
decide to do tomorrow. 
To show that (3) and (4) are consistent, however, Davis would have to show 
that (5) is consistent with (3) (and, hence, that (5) is possible). But Davis admits 
that he cannot do this; instead he contents himself with replying "to the arguments 
of those who claim that [(5)] is inconsistent" (p. 54). This is no doubt a worthwhile 
project, but it is not the same as showing that (3) and (4) are consistent. 
In Chapter 5 Davis presents and defends a definition of omnipotence. He 
writes, "a being B is omnipotent at a time t if and only if 
(D) for any state of affairs s after t such that there is a possible world 
sharing the history of the actual world up to t in which B brings about 
s, B can bring about s. 
I think that this definition is on the right track, but it needs modific'ltion. For 
one thing a definition of a property a being can possess in other possible worlds 
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should not make essential reference to the actual world, and, for another, the 
concept of a state of affair's being after a time has not been defined or explained. 
But my main concern is with the concepts of bringing about and sharing a 
history. By "bringing about a state of affairs" does Davis mean making it the 
case directly-"strongly actualizing" it, to use Plantinga's term? Or does he 
mean arranging for it to be the case, bringing it about indirectly, perhaps by 
relying on the cooperation of others? A remark on pp. 83f. suggests that Davis 
intends the latter, weaker sense, that is, "weakly actualizing" a state of affairs, 
but this is far from certain. And exactly what is included in the history of a 
possible world? Presumably the history of a world up to a certain time--call it 
the initial segment of the world to the time-should not include past truths about 
what agents wiIl freely do in various circumstances after that time, for two worlds 
can share an initial segment up until the time an agent freely does an act in the 
one world that he or she freely refrains from doing in the other world. I have 
argued elsewhere that God can be unable to weakly actualize a state of affairs 
that given what has already happened is nevertheless possible for him to weakly 
actualize, and that this is compatible with his being omnipotent. 4 If this is correct, 
we should try recasting (D) as 
(D') A being, B, is omnipotent in a world Wat a time t = df it is true 
in W that for every state of affairs s such that it is possible both that 
the initial segment of W up to t obtains and that B strongly actualizes 
s at t, B can strongly actualize s at t. 
(D') seems to me to be a fine definition. 5 
In Chapter 6, "Benevolence," Davis argues convincingly against some classical 
arguments for the conclusion that God is unable to do evil. He then claims that 
"[i]t is both logically possible and within God's power for him to do evil" (p. 
94). Davis defends this view by claiming that 
[i]f God is actually unable to do evil it is no more morally apt to 
praise him for his goodness than it is apt to praise the refrigerator for 
keeping the food cold or a spider for refraining from telling lies. 
Refrigerators are designed to keep food cold; they aren't agents who 
make choices; it isn't praiseworthy that they keep food cold. Spiders 
just aren't able to tell lies; it isn't praiseworthy that they don't. If God's 
nature causes or determines him to do good in such a way that doing 
evil is not in his power, I would conclude that he is not a free and 
responsible moral agent and thus is not a fit object of the praise and 
thanks of his people. (p. 95) 
I find this reasoning unpersuasive. Calvin wrote 
... suppose some blasphemer sneers that God deserves little praise for 
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his own goodness, constrained as he is to preserve it. Will this not be 
a ready answer to him: not from violent impulsion but from his boundless 
goodness comes God's inability to do evil?6 
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Of course I do not intend to accuse Davis of blasphemy or even of sneering, 
but why could not God be praiseworthy for goodness so boundless that it is not 
even possible for him to do evil? No doubt being essentially good does not make 
God more morally praiseworthy than merely being wholly but contingently 
good-the difference has to do with how good he is in other possible worlds, 
and this does not affect his goodness in the actual world. But being wholly good 
in every possible world would contribute to God's overall greatness, and thus 
provide grounds for praise. Finally, I would suggest that God could be essentially 
wholly good without being "caused by his nature" to do good. 
I have concentrated in this review on my disagreements with Davis, but there 
is much more to agree with in the book. I hope that I have given some sense of 
the range of important issues Davis discusses and the honest seriousness with 
which he conducts that discussion. 7 
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